This is compared to the general estimate for the Russian army’s optimal ammunition of up to 3 million tons, as voiced by Russian General Dmitry Bulgakov. Recall that, as of January 1, 2014, stocks for the same basic ammunition were estimated at approximately 1.3 million tons (see EDM, August 16). Even if we consider this to be a low estimate, even by half, then high-end estimates of these types of ammunition in 2022 would not exceed 500,000 tons. In total, over the nine years from 2014 to 2021, the Russian military industrial complex produced up to 230,000 tons of ammunition annually in the form of shells for 152-mm artillery systems and MLRSs. Approximately, this corresponds to data from the Ukrainian side, according to which Russian forces fire about 50,000–60,000 shells per day ( NV.ua, June 14).Īs of January 1, 2014, the total stock of usable main artillery shells (122mm, 152mm and 203mm) and MLRS rockets (122mm, 220mm and 300mm) possessed by the Russian army amounted to 1.3 million tons (, August 30, 2013). Systemīased on these rough estimates, the Armed Forces of Russia use approximately 67,000 units of rocket and artillery ammunition per day. Approximate Russian ammunition consumption in its war on Ukraine. Given this baseline, we can estimate the following statistics regarding ammunition consumption for the first five months of the Ukraine war (150 days from February 24). In turn, if Moscow stops its mass shelling, the Armed Forces of Ukraine may try to leverage their numerical superiority, with supplies being backed by weapons deliveries from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members.īased on an approximate consumption rate of 5,000–6,000 shells per gun per year, on average, artillery systems tend to fire up to 20 shells per day. However, if active hostilities do not end within the next few months, the Russian army will need to change its tactics and move to a more targeted use of rocket and artillery weapons, as well as increase the use of guided ammunition. In truth, the exhaustion of Russian ammunition stocks will not serve as the sole factor in turning the course of the war. In this regard, the situation is looking incredibly bleak for the Kremlin, in the short run, to fully compensate for the loss of main range ammunition for artillery and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). Estimates have exceeded 3 trillion rubles ($50 billion) if the war carries on until February 2023-much higher than the State Defense Order’s annual amount and comparable to the total amount Moscow spent on national defense during peacetime. Overall, the costs of replenishing ammunition at the current rate of use in Ukraine will be quite substantial. As reports come in of massive explosions at an ammunition depot in Crimea, the prospects for effectively increasing ammunition production in Russia are unclear ( Meduza, August 16).
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